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ABSTRACT
Over the last few decades, two theoretical approaches 
have been developed to explain the relationship between 
governments and interest groups: corporatism and plural­
ism. Traditionally, France has been labeled a corporatist 
state, however some characteristics of this nation suggest 
that it may in fact be a quasi-corporatist system, which 
might provide an explanation for the lack of unity and 
integration within the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Using French agricultural interest groups as a case study, 
this thesis will explain and demonstrate the impact pres­
sure groups have upon the decision-making process. Case 
studies from 1965, 1968, and 1983 suggest that French 
agricultural producers have the ability to influence policy- 
making in France, even when it does not coincide with the 
opinions of governmental officials. These case studies also 
suggest that even though some features of corporatism exist 
in France, characteristics of pluralism are also prevalent. 
Therefore, France may not completely fit into this supposed 
evolutionary age of corporatism.
FRANCE: A QUASI-CORPORATIST STATE
INTRODUCTION
Interest groups have long existed in societies. They 
provide men a means of organizing themselves in order to 
best express their opinions and interests, so that they may 
achieve their goal of influencing public policy. Over the 
past few decades scholars have become quite interested in 
this on going exchange between societies and their 
political systems. As a result of their studies, they have 
developed two theoretical approaches explaining this 
relationship: corporatism and pluralism. According to the
corporatist model there exist formal channels of access and 
communication between the state and pressure groups. There­
fore both participate in the decision-making process and the 
establishment of policies, which result from it. The 
pluralist approach does not believe that any institution­
alized relationship exists between interest groups and the 
government. Therefore these groups must attempt to 
influence governmental policy through the use of public 
propaganda, demonstrations, strikes, and the use of personal 
contacts.
Some scholars believe that since World War II many 
nations have begun to evolve into corporatist nations, 
thereby suggesting that the twentieth century may be the age 
of corporatism. France however, does not appear to be
2
3following this trend. The relationship between French 
agricultural workers and the government seems to be marked 
by both corporatist and pluralist characteristics. Some 
formal channels of access between these groups and the state 
have been established, as for example The Federation 
Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA), 
which was developed by the government after World War II in 
order to facilitate its communications with farmers.
However, despite these types of government established 
committees, agricultural interest groups still find the use 
of demonstrations, such as those of 1965, 1968, and 1983, to 
be quite effective in influencing policy. Since 
characteristics of both theories, corporatism and pluralism 
exist, France can only be labeled a quasi-corporatist state.
CHAPTER I
INTEREST GROUPS AND CORPORATISM IN FRANCE
Over the last few decades, scholars have developed two 
theoretical approaches to explain the relationship between 
society and state: pluralism and corporatism. France has
traditionally been characterized as a corporatist nation. 
However, some characteristics of this system, such as the 
relationship between farm groups and the government, do not 
coincide with the concepts of corporatism, thereby suggest­
ing that France may be a quasi-corporatist state. This 
raises implications for Europe, possibly explaining the lack 
of integration within the European Economic Community (EEC).
A. Interest Groups:
Corporatism and pluralism have helped to establish the 
different types of interest groups and their various forms 
of access into the political system. An interest group can 
be defined as a collection of individuals who unite on the 
basis of a common interest in order to influence public 
policy, but without attempting to control the political 
apparatus. Because of the varying types of interests these 
groups represent, according to Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, 
they can be classified under six different types: Communal,
Customary, Institutional, Protective, Promotional, and
4
Associational.1 The organization of Communal groups is based 
not upon a common interest, but rather upon a common bond 
which exists among members. New members are born into the 
group, not recruited. Very similar to Communal groups are 
Customary groups which are also united by a common bond. 
However, these types of groups do articulate interests 
through kinship and personal ties. Institutional groups are 
characterized by their formal organization, for example 
armies, legislatures and bureaucracies. Because of their 
proximity to the government, their articulated interests 
have considerable impact upon policy-making. Protective 
groups are organized to uphold the material interests of 
their members, for example trade unions or employer*s 
organizations. These groups are quite influential in the 
decision-making process since they often serve as consultants 
to the government. Promotional groups are joined by their 
desire to promote certain activities or values rather than to 
protect the interests of its members. These groups are most 
significant in first world countries where they can freely 
express the values and morals they stand for. Associational 
groups are organized for a specific purpose. Their interests 
and aims are limited. How then do these different types of 
pressure groups gain access into the political system?
^ o d  Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and 
Politics (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc.,
1987), pp. 121-125.
6B. Channels of access:
Interest groups influence the decision-making process 
either through direct dealings with the government, through 
political parties, or through public opinion. The basis for 
the group's organization often determines what method is best 
for penetrating the political system. Direct contact between 
groups and government officials occurs under various forms. 
First there can be group representation in the political 
elite itself, making this one of the most effective forms of 
access. However, problems exist since members of the 
political elite represent various interests and these may 
sometimes conflict with one another. Elite connections are 
another form of direct contact. In this group, leaders 
establish and use their relationships with government 
officials to influence their voice and vote in the 
formulation of policy. Elite connections are simply a 
network of personal relations which provide informal channels 
of access into the government. The bureaucracy and 
assemblies can also serve as means of obtaining access. 
However, the level of penetration into these branches depends 
upon the openness of the political system.
Interest groups can also attempt to influence decisions 
through indirect methods, such as through political parties 
and the media. Pressure groups can offer their support and 
votes to political parties in return for the representation 
of their interests. Mass media can be used to steer public 
opinion in a particular direction. When neither direct nor
indirect means of influencing the government are accessible, 
interest groups turn to protest and violence as methods of 
expressing their political demands.
The level of influence these pressure groups have is 
largely determined by the nature of the political system 
itself. The more open the system (first world nations), the 
greater effect they have. The legitimacy of the group is 
also a determining factor in its influencing power. The 
legitimacy accorded to the group, by both the government and 
the public, establish the level of respectability given to 
interest groups. Another factor which determines a group's 
influence is its level of tangible resources, which includes 
its financial power and member^.d.p level.
C. Corporatism vs. Pluralism:
The debate over corporatism and pluralism has attracted
scholars of many disciplines, backgrounds, and convictions.
Philippe C. Schmitter has emerged as the leading expert and
most widely recognized author in this field of study.
Schmitter defines corporatism and pluralism as the following
Corporatism can be defined as a system of inter­
est representation in which the constituent units 
are organized into a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered 
and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the 
state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their 
selection of leaders and articulation of demands 
and support.
Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest 
representation in which the constituent units 
are organized into an unspecified number of
8multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchi- 
cally ordered and self-determined (as to type 
or scope of interest) categories which are not 
specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, 
created or otherwise controlled in leadership 
selection or interest articulation by the state 
and which do not exercise a monopoly of represen­
tational activity within their respective cate­
gories. 2
Corporatism and pluralism have both been developed as 
means of understanding the relationship between the 
interests of society and the authority of the state in 
capitalist democracies. After World War II, many academics 
felt that conventional pluralist theories no longer provided 
an adequate explanation of the changes that were taking place 
between the state and various interest groups. They believed 
that pluralism assumed too passive a role for the state, and 
that it failed to explain the process by which representative 
lobbies were being transformed into mere extensions of their 
governments. Therefore, in an attempt to provide such an 
explanation, these critics revived corporatist ideas, that 
had been discussed as far back as World War I.
Scholars believed that the twentieth century would 
become the age of corporatism, bringing an end to the 
laissez-faire era. After having disassociated corporatism 
from is pejorative association with fascism and nazism, 
academics then had to explain how this new form of interest 
group/state relationship would come about. In his book,
Le Corporatisme dissociation en Suisse. J. Malherbe
2Philippe C. Schmitter, Trends Toward Corporatist 
Intermediation (London: SAGE Publications, 1979), pp. 13 &
15.
9suggests that "corporatism appears under two very different 
guises: the revolutionary and the evolutionary. It is 
either the product of a 'new order1 following from a funda­
mental overthrow of the political and economic institutions 
of a given country and created by force or special 
'collective spirit'; or the outcome of a natural evolution 
in economic and social ideas and events."3 In the after- 
math of the Second World War, nations, finding themselves in 
the midst of widespread devastation and appalling poverty, 
found a new willingness to bridge their national and 
international differences in the task of reconstruction and 
economic recovery. There was a demand for restructuring the 
division of labor and its benefits, in order to create one 
social class and the even distribution of wealth. Europeans 
wanted to expand their role in public policy by associating 
and incorporating their classes and interest groups in the 
political process, thereby involving themselves more closely 
in the decision-making machinery.
What then, are the features of corporatism which 
distinguish it from pluralism? Similarities exist between 
the two concepts in that both accept, recognize and seek to 
offer solutions to coping with the growing structural 
differentiation and interest diversity of modern political 
systems. The most prominent feature of corporatism is a set 
of statutory institutions, whose function is to facilitate 
contacts between government officials and representatives of
3Schmitter, p. 15.
authorized interest groups. This process assures the 
mandatory participation of interest groups in the decision­
making process, which are given the opportunity to bargain 
over policy with government representatives and a cartel of 
organized pressure groups. In order to further integrate 
interest groups into the political system, corporatism also 
charges them with implementing policy decisions. Because of 
this institutionalized access into the decision-making 
process, the need for personal associations within the 
government, parliamentary lobbying and appeals to the public, 
all in order to influence policy, are diminished. States 
under corporatist direction also experience few organized 
demonstrations and strikes since communication between groups 
and the government is so thorough.
Corporatism has also been divided into two subtypes: 
social and state corporatism. Corporatist theorist, Mihail 
Manoilesco defines social corporatism as a system in which 
the legitimacy and functioning of a government are depen­
dent upon the activity of singular, noncompetitive, 
hierarchically ordered representative groups.4 In other 
words, a social corporatist system is one with relatively 
autonomous, multilayered units, open and competitive 
electoral processes and party systems. In state corpora­
tism, groups are created and maintained as auxiliary and 
dependent organs of the state. Under this form of corpora­
tism, the legitimacy and functioning of the political system
4Schmitter, p. 20.
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relies upon interest groups. In state corporatist systems 
interest groups are subordinate to the central political 
power, elections are either nonexistent or plebiscitary, and 
political parties are either dominated or monopolized by a 
single party.
While corporatism lies at one end of the spectrum, 
pluralism lies at the other. In a pluralist type system 
formal contacts between interest groups and government 
officials are less frequent if not nonexistent. Interest 
groups work from outside the political machinery in order to 
influence policy, instead of being directly involved in the 
decision-making process. Since no institutional channels 
exist for these groups to penetrate the government, they 
must rely upon personal contacts, their electoral strength, 
the mobilization of public support, and when all else fails, 
strikes and demonstrations.
D. Corporatism in France:
How then does the French political system fit into 
either of these models? There are divergent views on the 
nature of French interest group politics. While some 
scholars, such as Henry W. Ehrmann, have categorized France 
as a corporatist state, others, for example Philippe C. 
Schmitter, believe it to be a pluralist system. Beginning 
with the Third Republic, interest groups in France have 
played an important role in shaping political attitudes and 
governmental policy. Traditionally, leaders of these 
pressure groups have been brought together with public
officials through the use of consultative committees. After 
World War II the number of these bodies was largely 
increased. However, in 1958 their numbers and power 
declined due to the personal philosophy of President Charles 
de Gaulle, who viewed them as particularistic and therefore 
not useful to the public's interest. In 1981, when the 
Socialist Party came into office, once again the number of 
committees increased as the Socialist government sought 
greater democratic participation through its program of 
decentralization. Groups that had previously been excluded, 
or that had been inactive, as well as a few new ones, were 
given membership on committees. Over the years however, the 
government has shown a lack of control over the activities, 
interests pursued, and the selection of leadership within 
these groups. There has also been the lack of, if not the 
total absence of interest group/state negotiations. As a 
result, pressure groups have not always been allowed to 
participate in the decision-making process.
In 1982, Frank L. Wilson,, of Purdue University, interviewed 
several French interest group leaders and members? his 
findings were later published in The American Political 
Science Review. Dr. Wilson reported that "nearly all 
respondents claimed that the government dominated the 
committees. Very few committees had anything more than a 
purely consultative or advisory task: the government could,
13
and often did, ignore the advice.”5 Some academics there­
fore argue that in actuality the French system is not a 
corporatist model, since its corporatist ideas have only a 
paper existence.
French agricultural interest groups offer a good 
example of the low level of corporatism and presence of 
pluralism in France, causing some experts to label this 
political system at most a quasi-corporatist state, since it 
does not completely fit into either model. After World War 
II, until 1981, extensive corporatist interaction was most 
visible in the agricultural sector. However, as previously 
discussed, though there are corporatist type structures, this 
does not necessarily mean that corporatism exists, 
especially when the government fails to give any power to 
pressure groups. As in the case of France neither conser­
vative nor leftist governments have ever granted political 
power to any of the groups they proliferated. Historically 
corporatism has infiltrated the French agricultural sector by 
providing it with a national interest association, The 
Federation Nationale des Syndicats d 'Exploitants Agricoles 
(FNSEA), and at times with conferences and committees meeting 
with government officials. However interest groups' lack of 
power in policy making and the breakdown of communications 
between government ministers and group leaders, has often 
caused these groups to seek other methods of influence. As a
5Frank L. Wilson, French Interest Group Politics: 
Pluralist or Neocorporatist?” The American Political 
Science Review (1982), p. 900.
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result, characteristics of pluralism, such as public relations 
campaigns, personal contacts, parliamentary lobbying, demon­
strations and strikes also exist in the French political 
system.
E. Conclusion:
Many scholars believe that the current movement toward 
corporatism has been facilitated by the presence of social 
democratic governments? France however seems to be an 
exception to this purported trend. The organization and 
activities of French agricultural interest groups, as well as 
their relations with government officials and their power to 
influence policy decisions have not always demonstrated signs 
of an evolutionary movement toward corporatism. At times, 
interest group/state relations in France have reflected some 
characteristics of pluralism. This suggests that instead of 
corporatism, France is actually evolving into a quasi- 
corporatist state. Why then has corporatism failed to 
completely penetrate the French system? In the case of the 
agricultural sector, this failure is due to the power and 
organization of agricultural workers.
CHAPTER II
POWER AND ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
"It is all too easy to fall into the trap of giving 
undue emphasis to the proclaimed objectives of official 
policy makers to the neglect of the obstacles in their 
path."1 Most examinations of the agricultural policy of 
France, focus upon the ideas, opinions, and decisions of 
the French government. The interests and needs of those 
closest and most directly involved in agriculture, the 
farmers, are sometimes overlooked or misunderstood. Yet 
farmers wield such political power that they greatly 
influence the decision-making process.
A. Source of agricultural power:
In democratic societies such as France, government 
officials acquire power through an election or appointment 
process, and exercise this power within the limits and 
regulations of the established political system. There­
fore, their power is rendered unto them by voters, for 
without the support of citizens they can not legitimately 
attain positions of power. Power, however, can also be 
obtained outside of the political apparatus and without
^ a c k  Hayward, The State and the Market Economy (New 
York: New York University Press, 1986), p. 1.
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the support of a majority. For example, for years, French 
agricultural workers have had the ability, or power, to 
influence the decision-making process of France. If their 
power to influence is not due to the results of public 
elections, then how is it gained?
The political and social power of French farm workers 
is derived from several different sources. One explanation 
for their strength is their perceived role and importance 
in French history. It was the French peasantry that 
organized and led the Revolution of 1789, which caused 
France to break away from its long period of a ruling 
monarchy and restructure its political and social systems. 
Therefore, farm workers have often been commended for 
laying the social and political ground work of the Third 
and Fourth Republics. In turn, this prestige has helped to 
legitimize their ideas and opinions. As Sydney Nettleton 
Fisher explains, "some historians feel that the French 
Revolution helped to give increased political strength to 
the farmers, who developed their large numbers into 
powerful pressure groups to resist displacement and obtain 
protection."2
A second factor explaining why French agricultural 
workers are so powerful is the numbers they represent.
Prior to its engagement in the European Common Market, over
2Sydney Nettleton Fisher, France and the European 
Community (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 86.
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40% of France1s population was classified as agricultural.3 
It is therefore understandable why fanners, representing 
such a large percentage of the population, became so 
important to the French government. For example, in 1957, 
French officials first sought the support of the agrarian 
society before approaching the Parliament for ratification 
of France's Common Market membership. Quite logically, to 
many politicians, 4 0% of the population could simply be 
translated or transformed into 4 0% of the people's vote, by 
representing the interests of French farmers.
However, since 1957, the percentage of Frenchmen 
involved in agriculture has drastically declined. Between 
1954 and 1979, 3.2 million people left the agricultural 
sector.4 By 1980, only 8.62% of the French population was 
still involved in agriculture.5 There are two main reasons 
why so many French farmers left their farms: industrial­
ization and the French government's "remembrement" program. 
After World War II, France began a period of rapid in­
dustrial growth. As industries were established and 
developed, employment opportunities quickly grew and many 
farmers realized that more money was to be earned in 
France's factories than on its farms. Historically, French
3Fisher, p. 86.
4Henry W. Erhmann, Politics France (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1983), p. 29.
5Mervyn O. Pragnell, The International Year Book and 
Statesmen's Who's Who 1987 (England: Thomas Skinner
Directories, 1987), p. 198.
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farmers have held small amounts of land, which most often 
were divided into several dispersed parcels. After joining 
the EEC, the French government began pursuing "remembre- 
ment,M a plan which would unite and connect small in­
dividual segments of land, creating fewer, but larger 
farms. As a result of this consolidation process, by 198 0 
around half a million of France's 1.2 million farms were 
more than 50 acres, with more than 150,000 of these being 
above 125 acres.6 In 1955, there existed 2,300,000 farms 
in France, whereas in 1980, there were only 1,2 60,000, a 
decline of 2.5% per year.7 Today, though French farmers no 
longer represent a majority of the population, they remain 
powerful. One reason is that their past numbers, which 
once gave them a majority, has also provided them a certain 
level of respectability, which has been carried through to 
the 1980's. Secondly, despite declines in the number of 
farm workers, agricultural production in France has 
steadily increased, changing the social significance of 
farmers to an economic importance.
A third explanation of why French farmers are so 
influential is the economic values they represent to France 
and the Common Market. 85% of the French soil is arable, 
making France not only a predominantly agricultural nation, 
but also the largest potential farming area in the
6Tony Allan, Ed., Library of Nations: France
(Chicago, Illinois: Time Life Books Pub., 1985), p. 92.
7Pragnell, p. 196.
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Community.8 Today, French agricultural production 
represents 27% of the European Market's agricultural 
output.9 This of course gives the French government a 
substantial amount of power within the European Economic 
Community (EEC), which imports 66% of France's agricultural 
exports.10 Often labeled as the "bread basket of Europe," 
France provides her EC partners a large percentage of 
their food supplies. Among countries that, not too long 
ago, experienced the pain, suffering and death caused by 
shortages of food, France finds its high levels of agricul­
tural production to be quite influential. These high 
levels of productivity, however, have not always existed. 
For example, before 1939 France produced only ten to twelve 
million tons of grain per year, but by 1970 she was 
producing 36 million tons annually.11 This increase in 
productivity is attributed to the rise in the use of modern 
machinery and technology, such as tractors and fertilizers. 
For example, in 1950 there were more than two million 
farms, but only 150,000 tractors in use; however, by 197 3 
there were 1.3 million farms and just as many tractors 
being used.12 The European Community, through its CAP
8Pragnell, p. 195.
°Jean-Yves Potel, L'Etat de la France et de ses 
habitants (Paris: La Decouverte, 1985), p. 350.
10Pragnell, p. 200.
■^Allan, Ed., p. 91.
12Allan, Ed., p. 91.
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program and financial assistance, has been the primary 
financial benefactor for France's agricultural moderniza­
tion. This often leaves French policy makers in a conflict 
between serving the interests of the EC (its modernizer), 
and French farmers (a great source of its yearly GNP).
B. Organization of agricultural power;
"In every polity there exist means to bring the 
demands and desires prevalent in the society to the 
attention of the decision makers."13 Having the ability to 
influence policy-makers is not sufficient. In order to be 
most effective, French agricultural workers also organize 
themselves.
Throughout the history of France, the organization of 
agricultural interests has undergone much internal con­
flict. During the Third Republic, many competing interest 
groups fought to influence and obtain subsidies from the 
government. But most failed under the Vichy Regime, which 
was dominated by Germany. After World War II, various sub­
sidiary groups reasserted their autonomy. These agricul­
tural pressure groups differed according to their varying 
interests, needs, and sometimes their geographical loca­
tion. Consequently, during the Fourth Republic there 
existed over 500 different agricultural interest groups.
In 1946, the French government attempted to implement
13Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., 
Comparitive Politics: Systems. Process, and Policy
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), p. 169.
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the corporatist concept, when four large agricultural 
organizations were established with governmental assis­
tance, in hopes of uniting various pressure groups and 
better combining their demands. The Federation Nationale 
des Syndicats d 1Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA), the 
Assemblee Permanente des Chambres d'Agriculture (APCA), the 
Confederation Nationale de la Mutualite, du Credit, et de 
la Cooperation Agricole (CNMCCA) and the Centre Nationale 
des Jeunes Agriculteurs (CNJA) all became the government's 
instruments for modernizing France's means of agricultural 
production.
In 1970, due to the FNSEA's quasi-governmental 
reputation, all four organizations were turned over to 
FNSEA officials and are now largely supported by public 
funds. However, many branches of the government still 
recognize the FNSEA as the only representative of farmers' 
interests. These four organizations, under the leadership 
of the FNSEA, have often been criticized for not represent­
ing the interests of French farmers, but rather simply 
reflecting those of the government. Rival organizations 
complain about governmental pressures, especially in 
regions where they threaten the FNSEA's dominance. 
Opposition by farmers to the policies of the French 
government and those of the Common Market, led to severe 
tensions within the FNSEA and the eventual emergence of 
rival groups. The failure of the FNSEA to organize and 
consolidate agricultural interests, represents the French
22
governments inability to assimilate corporatism into its 
political system.
The strongest of these opposition groups is the 
Mouvement de Defense des Exploitant Familiaux (MODEF), 
founded in 1959. MODEF represents the interests and 
demands of small agricultural producers. It's program is 
inspired by the Communist party and is anti-capitalist. 
However, it defends property owners and stands against the 
French government's "remembrement" policy, which it feels 
only works to the advantage of large agricultural 
producers, since only they can afford to buy land, while 
small farmers can only afford to sell theirs. Other 
opposition groups were also founded, such as, the Federa­
tion Francaise de 1* Agriculture (FFA) in 19 69, the 
Confederation Nationale des Syndicats de Travailleurs- 
Paysans (CNSTP) founded in 1981, and most recently the 
Federation Nationale des Syndicats Paysans (FNSP) in 1982. 
The existence of the various opposition groups, demon­
strates the presence of pluralism in the French system. 
Nonetheless, they are still not as effective as the FNSEA, 
which continues to operate with government support. This 
on-going relationship between the FNSEA and the government 
represents a continued existence of corporatism, however 
because it co-exists with pluralism, the French system fits 
completely into neither model, and is therefore a quasi- 
corporatist state.
Since 1981, the Mitterrand government has been
23
pursuing a program of decentralization, which has opened up 
new access to other pressure groups, furthering pluralism 
in France. What has been France's policy toward agricul­
ture since World War II? This increase in pluralism also 
raises some implications for Europe, possibly explaining 
the lack of unity with the EEC. The exploration of 
corporatism at the European Community level has somewhat 
been neglected by scholars, despite the fact that the EC 
has encouraged its development in member nations. The 
impact of quasi-corporatism in France upon the Community 
will be further discussed in Chapter III.
CHAPTER III
FRENCH AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND EC AGRICULTURAL POLICY
A. French policy:
After the tremendous destruction caused by World War 
II, France underwent some fundamental changes in her 
institutions, ideologies and means of production. This 
transformation was based upon three concepts: nationaliza­
tion, planning and modernization. In 1957, the French 
government helped formulate and establish the European 
Economic Community. France hoped that, through its parti­
cipation in the EEC, its agricultural production would 
attain a level of self-sufficiency, which it regarded as a 
vital part of France's national defense. French officials 
believed that the adoption of a free trade system within 
Europe would help hasten structural adjustments and the 
modernization of France's productive apparatus. Free trade 
would bring in competition for both the industrial and the 
agricultural producers, thereby forcing them to adopt new 
policies and means of production in order to remain 
competitive with foreign producers.
Establishing self-sufficiency was not enough to ensure 
France's national security, especially at a time when past 
experiences with Germany continued to haunt Frenchmen.
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Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France, said that 
through economic unification he wanted to make sure that 
war between France and Germany "is not only unthinkable, 
but materially impossible."1 The French government 
believed that by including West Germany in this European 
organization, the threat of another German attack would not 
only be curtailed, but in any case could at least be 
containable. Another reason for joining the EC was that as 
France began losing control of her colonial empire, the 
European market became her most viable substitute. The 
Community was more dynamic than France*s colonial markets, 
which after independence were faced with internal 
structural problems. The Common Market eventually turned 
out to be a substitute for France's lost colonial markets.
B. EC oolicv:
The two major achievements of the Community are the 
establishment of a customs union and the development of a 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Provisions for the 
Common Market called for the elimination of all custom 
duties between member states over a ten year transitional 
period. Traditionally, prior to the establishment of the 
EEC, the French market was safeguarded from foreign 
competitors by numerous protectionist measures making it 
somewhat more difficult for French producers to adapt to
1Sydney Nettleton Fisher, France and the European 
Community (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 84.
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this custom free market. The French population, as a 
whole, was not too enthusiastic about this new policy 
orientation. But many French officials believed that a 
customs free market would promote the industrialization and 
technological advancement of France, which at this time 
lagged behind other European states.
C. The Common Agricultural Policy:
It was not until January of 1962, four years after the 
establishment of the EEC, that the general terms for a 
Common Agricultural Policy were drawn up. Though the EC 
was founded upon liberal trading principles, the CAP was 
structured around the belief that protectionism was 
essential in the agricultural sector. Article 39 of the 
Treaties of Rome which established the EEC, set out the 
five objectives of the CAP:
1. To increase agricultural productivity?
2. To ensure a fair standard of living for the
agricultural community;
3. To stabilize markets;
4. To assure the availability of supplies?
5. To ensure that supplies reach consumers at
reasonable prices.2
The CAP was established upon three basic principles: free
internal trade, preference for member countries and shared
financial responsibilities. This program consists of two
2Andrea Boltho, Ed., The European Economy; Growth and 
Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 234.
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basic parts: a market policy, which guarantees prices, and
a structural policy, which provides funding for improving 
agricultural efficiency. The market policy, or the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), 
prescribes prices for products, provides import levies, 
export subsidies and subsidies for domestic markets. The 
financing for these support systems is shared by all 
members of the Common Market through the organization's 
budget.
D. The CAP and French policy:
When the CAP was established, its objectives were 
quite congruent with those of the French government: both 
sought to increase the market capacity for producers and to 
improve their means of production. At this time, it could 
be said that French policy, especially in the agricultural 
sector, was a mere reflection of the EEC's program. Accord­
ing to author Udo Rehfeldt, "to some extent, the CAP (which 
has consisted mainly of price subsidies) has completed the 
French agricultural policy of 'structural reforms' 
inaugurated in I960."3 By providing subsidies to French 
farmers, the Community has helped the French government 
achieve its goals at a lower price than it would have 
incurred had it had to solely support its agrarian society.
3Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos, Integration and 
Unequal Development: The Experience of the EEC (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 171.
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CAP subsidies partially freed the French budget from the 
need to provide agricultural subsidies, thus enabling the 
French government to provide greater assistance to its 
industrial sector, which was being challenged by highly 
structured and technocratic West German manufacturers.
In 1957, well over 40% of the French population was 
involved in agriculture, giving farmers great political 
power. In light of their political strength, it is 
understandable why the French government sought the support 
of its agrarian society. French officials stressed to 
their farmers that membership in the Common Market and 
economic integration would provide great benefits to French 
agriculture. The French government also explained to 
farmers that participation in the EC would not only help 
unify Europe economically, but that political integration 
would also eventually occur. With the memories of good 
scarcities during the two World Wars still vivid in their 
minds, and their ambitions for a prosperous agricultural 
recovery, French fanners supported the conditions 
establishing the Common Market as well as the 1962 
provisions which founded the CAP.
E. Problems with the CAP:
By 1970 the Common Agricultural Policy seemed to have 
failed. The cost of the policy to the Community*s budget 
had rapidly risen since the mid-1960*s. The cost of food 
to the consumer was forced up by farm prices, which were
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far above the level at which competitive supplies were 
available from the world market. Yet despite these high 
prices, many EC farmers lived in poverty. Surplus produc­
tion of several different products not only further 
burdened the community's budget, but also disrupted world 
agricultural markets. Increases in the EEC•s membership 
changed the balance of interests represented in the CAP.4 
Employment in agriculture dropped from "22.7% of the 
civilian labor force of the six in 1958 to 11.5% in 1972."5 
Another problem faced by the CAP was the exchange rate 
variations of member country currencies.
In answer to these many problems facing the CAP, the 
Commission of the European Communities proposed a 
structural reform program which ensured that some five 
million Europeans would leave agriculture by 1980, taking 
some five million acres of land out of farming. EC 
officials believed this program would not only bring about 
a reduction of agricultural surpluses, but would also 
eventually raise the incomes of farmers. The Council of 
Ministers agreed on the main features of a revised 
structural policy in 1971. By April 1972, three directives 
were approved on farm modernization, the provision of 
retirement aids, and vocational guidance.
4Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the 
European Economic Community on January 1, 1973.
5John S. Marsh, European Economic Issues (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 10.
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F. Conclusions:
Agricultural policies are usually made by governments 
for their own people. Therefore international decisions, 
such as those of the EC, about domestic farm policy are 
often regarded as of secondary importance. The European 
Community, in establishing the CAP, has had to contend with 
complex internal problems. The Common Agricultural Program 
was founded and operates upon a bargaining process where 
decisions are often the result of compromise. The CAP has 
made great contributions to the development of the 
Community, but since the 1970's, EC agricultural policy has 
tended to exemplify disunity, rather than convergence 
between Community members. This lack of unity can be 
attributed to changes which have taken place outside of the 
CAP, such as inflation and the expansion of EC membership. 
However, it is also due to the lack of corporatism within 
the political systems of member states. For example, as 
pluralism began infiltrating the corporatist system of 
France, it created various interest groups, each seeking to 
influence government policy in favor of its own interests. 
Even though pluralism has helped to develop a more 
democratic and open system in France, it has also caused 
disunity within the nation. EC member nations are 
therefore faced with the task of creating unity from 
within, before they can attempt to unite as a Community.
31
Today the interests of the European Community do not 
always coincide with those of its individual member 
nations. Therefore the French government, as well as 
others, must choose between the needs of Europe and those 
of its own people, as shown in the case studies in the 
following chapter. It is when nations choose to pursue 
their self-interests, or the demands of their pressure 
groups, that the welfare of the Common Market is threatened 
and the visions of a "United States of Europe" begin to 
fade.
CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDIES
Through the use of several case studies this chapter 
will demonstrate the influence power of French agricul­
tural producers and the impact they have had upon the 
decision-making process of France and European integration.
A. 1965 case study:
Originally, French agricultural workers were committed 
to the idea of a Common Market, even prior to the ratifi­
cation of the Treaty. It was not until 1965, eight years 
after the establishment of the EEC, that French farmers 
first opposed the Community's agricultural policy. Why 
then did these farmers change their views on the European 
Common Market? Changes in their attitudes and support can 
best be explained by the ignorance which existed among 
them. In the beginning, farmers, along with many other 
social classes, encouraged the unification of Europe, both 
economically and politically. A study made in early 1962 
proved this to still be true, when "22 out of 100 peasants 
(farmers) were 'very much for' efforts aiming at the 
unification of Europe, and another 45 per cent were more 
'for' than 'against' such efforts, with only 1 per cent
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'very much opposed', 29 per cent had no opinion."1 
However, "when it came to making sacrifices in the process 
of unifying Europe, the peasantry (the farmers) was most 
outspokenly against any such ideas."2 During the first 
stages of discussions concerning the Treaties of Rome, 
there was no direct communication between the French 
government and the people. In 1957, it appears that most 
French farmers were not fully aware that changes were in 
the making which would affect their own future more than 
most policy measures of the past. Government officials 
only emphasized to agricultural organizations the positive 
effects the EC would have upon farmers. Therefore, the 
initial support offered by French farmers was based upon 
misinformation and misconceptions. These agricultural 
producers could only become informed by directly involving 
themselves with, or rather being affected by, France's 
participation in the Common Market. Four years passed 
between the ratification of the Treaty in 1957 and the 
establishment of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 
1962, and then a few more years passed before the impact of 
the CAP could be felt? all of this explains the delay in 
the farmers' reactions, which first occurred in 1965.
Throughout the Third and Fourth Republics, most of 
the agricultural population supported all major political
1Hanns Peter Muth, French Agriculture and the Political 
Integration of Western Europe (The Netherlands: A.W.
Sijthoff - Leyden, 1970), p. 178.
2Muth, pp. 178-179.
34
movements, favoring both conservative and left-wing 
parties. At the beginning of the Fifth Republic farmers 
began for the first time, consolidating their support of 
the right-wing, thereby nationalizing their political 
commitment. Until 1958, relations between farmers and 
President Charles de Gaulle had been quite smooth. In 
1958, an overwhelming majority of French citizens supported 
de Gaulle, giving him 78.5% of their votes in the December 
Presidential election. However, after 1958, relations 
between agricultural workers and President de Gaulle's 
government became strained and bitter as farmers became 
enraged by official policies. Right from the beginning, 
French agricultural workers had always supported France's 
participation in the Common Market, believing they stood to 
benefit from it. French farmers were first angered by the 
government in July of 1958, when it imposed various new tax 
programs and decrees Which would increase prices by 7%, all 
in order to hold the 1958 budget deficit to a maximum of 
600 billion francs (or $1.43 billion); this plan, however, 
at the same time reduced the previously promised 10% 
increase in wheat prices to 7%. As a result several 
demonstrations were held, but all had little impact or 
influence.
Farmers were best able to affect the government and 
its policies in 1965. Conflict of interests eventually 
reached their peak between June and December of that year. 
Original plans for financing a common EC agricultural
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policy, adopted in 1962, called for member states to 
collect import levies separately, and then pay national 
assessments into a fund established by the Community to 
finance its farm program. This farm program had 
established the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), which financed two major farm 
programs:
(1) EEC purchases of surplus farm products?
(2) Export subsidies for the sale of EEC farm 
products to non-EEC countries, at world prices, 
which were below Community prices.
This original program was due to expire June 30, 1965.
Therefore the Commission of the European Communities
submitted a new program proposal to its member nations.
Under the Commission's new agricultural policy, import
levies would be paid directly to the EEC's agricultural
fund, which in turn would be controlled by the European
Parliament.
On June 15, 1965, French Foreign Minister, Maurice 
Couve de Murville pushed for a two and a half year delay in 
French plans for a Common Market in farm products, thereby 
delaying the Common Agricultural Policy. The French 
government felt that the Commission's new program was just 
another step toward "supranationalism" within the Commu­
nity, and therefore, aiming to maintain some sovereignty, 
it chose to oppose it. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville 
proposed to the European Council that complete EC control 
of agriculture in the six member states be delayed from
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July 1, 1967 to the end of 1969. At this time it was 
estimated that the French government's proposal would cost 
France's farm economy one million dollars between 1967 and 
1969, the proposed two and a half year delay period. This 
of course made no sense to either French farm federations 
or the remaining five EC members, especially since France 
stood to gain the most from a Common Agriculture Program. 
French farmers began demonstrating and protesting in large 
numbers. Opposition to the French government's proposal 
was also expressed within the EC, especially by Italian 
Foreign Minister Fanfani.
After the Council failed to adopt an agricultural 
finance plan at its June 30th meeting, French officials 
announced on July 6th that France would boycott any future 
EEC meetings. On July 22, 1965, the Commission submitted a 
revised proposal to its six members, which was primarily 
designed to satisfy France. This new proposal included two 
major concessions to France:
(1) The Commission dropped its earlier plans under 
which the EEC would have had an independent 
revenue from industrial duties and agricultural 
levies, beginning July 1, 1967.
(2) The Commission accepted the French proposal made 
June 15th and 3 0th for the adoption of an 
agricultural finance plan to run from July 1, 
1965 through December 31, 19 69.
Much to the dismay of French farmers, the French government 
accepted this new program. Though French agricultural 
producers were unable to sway the demands of their govern­
ment, later on that year they were able to create some
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impact on its future European policies.
Producers, who continued to support the idea of 
economic integration, felt that Charles de Gaulle's govern­
ment had not only damaged the unification process, but had 
also hurt them economically. Opposition to the government 
increased, which became detrimental to Charles de Gaulle, 
as he soon faced his second Presidential election in 
December of 1965. On December 3, 1965, only two days 
before the first ballot election, Charles de Gaulle, in a 
television address, pledged to work for the "economic 
union" of the EC. His statement had of course been 
directed to French farmers, who by this time no longer 
supported him. De Gaulle's attempt at regaining their 
votes was unsuccessful, and he therefore failed to obtain a 
majority vote on the first ballot round, receiving only 
43.97% of the votes. However, on the second ballot, held 
on December 19th, de Gaulle was able to defeat his major 
opponent, Francois Mitterrand, with 55.2% of the vote. 
Though Charles de Gaulle won the 1965 Presidential 
election, he suffered a personal loss. Prior to the first 
ballot, de Gaulle believed an overwhelming majority of 
Frenchmen supported him; therefore his lack of support was 
not only a shock, but also a disappointment.
In 1965, "when de Gaulle and the agricultural syndi­
cate, the FNSEA, were at loggerheads over the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), farmers voted against de Gaulle 
in the Presidential election and were held (statistically)
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responsible for de Gaulle suffering the indignity of a 
second ballot."3 The effects of the 1965 Presidential 
election could somewhat explain why de Gaulle's government 
pushed so hard in 1966 for high common price levels within 
the EEC. Once agreement was reached on common prices, it 
was estimated that France would gain the most from these 
increases. This government action might have been an 
attempt to compensate farmers for the loss they were 
thought to have incurred in 1965. It could also have been 
a means to regain their support before the 1968 
Pariiamentary elections.4
The events of 1965 demonstrate the first case during 
the Fifth Republic in which French farmers successfully 
utilized their power, through the use of demonstrations and 
their vote, in order to influence government policies.
Though their actions had little impact upon the EC's 
adoption of a new agricultural financial plan for 1967, 
they did influence future agricultural decision making. At 
this time, farmers favored the integration of Europe, 
believing that it would benefit their economic status. 
Usually "farmers vote for the party or alliance which 
promises them most in material gains and which carries out
3Philip G. Cerny and Martin A. Schain, Socialism, the 
State and Public Policy in France (New York: Methuen, Inc., 
1985), p. 250.
4In June of 1968 the Gaullist part overwhelmingly won 
in Parliamentary elections. For more details on 
Parliamentary elections in France see Politics in France by 
Henry W. Ehrmann, Chapter IV, pages 100-135.
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.its promises through policy."5 Therefore, in 1965 it was 
only natural that they favored EC policy over French 
policy.
B: 1968-69 case studv:
Throughout 1968 and 1969 the French government once 
again found itself in conflict with its farmers. During 
the course of 1968 doubts concerning the adequacy of the 
existing Common Agricultural Policy began to emerge. On 
October 17, 1967, Dr. Sicco Mansholt, the member of the 
European Commission in charge of agriculture, addressed the 
Ministers of Agriculture of the Six. Dr. Mansholt 
explained to these ministers that even though the CAP had 
barely been established, it was already reaching the limits 
of its potential. Prices could not be raised to a level 
which would allow farm incomes to achieve parity with other 
sectors without creating large surpluses for many products. 
Income parity required a rapid growth of productivity in 
European agriculture and simultaneously a continuation in 
the reduction of the number of agricultural producers. 
Before EC members Dr..Mansholt concluded that only a 
fundamental change in the agricultural policy of the Com­
munity could solve their problems, and therefore recom­
mended that there should be Community regional planning of 
agricultural production. In light of Dr. Mansholt's 
theories and ideas, the Ministers of Agriculture requested
5Cerny and Schain, p. 251.
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that he submit a full report to the Commission.
Dr. Mansholt*s call for a Community structural policy 
heightened interest in the report he was preparing, but 
also brought about various other thoughts for a new 
approach. On October 18, 1968, Dr. Mansholt presented his 
findings and recommendations to the EEC Commission. By the 
end of December of 1968 the Commission had formally adopted 
the proposals and submitted them to the Council of 
Ministers. The specific goals of the plan were:
(1) to reduce the outlay for price support 
operations;
(2) to create larger, economically viable farms 
which warrant capital investment and yield an 
adequate return to their operators;
(3) to use price policy to guide production in 
accordance with requirements;
(4) to take five million hectares of agricultural 
land out of production;
(5) to facilitate the movement of five million 
persons out of agriculture during the 1970*s 
either by advanced retirement schemes or by 
training for other occupations; and
(6) to improve marketing.6
Basically the plan suggested that the only practical way of 
increasing the incomes of farmers was through a structural 
reform of the production process. Dr. Mansholt recommended 
an increase in the size of farms and a reduction in the 
number of farmers.. It was believed that industries, which 
at the time enjoyed an annual growth rate in the GNP of 3%,
6John S. Marsh, European Economic Issues (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 142.
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could absorb this reduction of half the agricultural labor 
force. Larger and more productive farm units, however, 
would worsen the problem of surpluses. Therefore, the 
Commission recommended that between 1970 and 1980 some five 
million hectares of land be taken out of agriculture to be 
reforested, thus diminishing the EC's deficit in wood.
There were various reactions to the Mansholt Plan, 
but they were hardly enthusiastic. The Plan mostly served 
to persuade member governments of the need for a new 
approach in the CAP. The Community's farmers were among 
those most opposed and hostile to the Plan, which was quite 
understandable since it was designed to remove half of them 
from the land. French government officials reacted by 
stressing to other members that structural reform was the 
responsibility of all involved in the EC. Believing it had 
to work towards reformation, the French government 
appointed a commission, headed by Professor Georges Vedel, 
to study the future of French agriculture and make some 
recommendations to alleviate any possible problems. The 
commission's findings, known as the Vedel Report, was 
published in August of 1969. The first part simply pre­
sented an analysis of the problems facing French farmers.
At the request of the French Minister of Agriculture, 
Jacques Duhamel, the Commission presented its proposed 
remedies in June of 1969, under the title: Proposals for a
New Agricultural Policy. It was not until September of 
1969, after three months had elapsed, that the document was
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published, demonstrating the French government's reluctance 
to release a document which it knew its farmers would find 
as provocative as the Mansholt Plan.
The Vedel Report called for the following, over a 
fifteen year period:
(1) a reduction in the number of farms in France 
from 1.5 million to 250,000, each of which would 
employ some two to four people;
(2) a reduction in the active agricultural 
population from 3 million to 600,000 - 700,000?
(3) a cut of 12 million hectares in the present total 
of 32 million hectares used for agriculture;
(4) an increase in the minimum farm size from 2 0 to 
80 hectares?
(5) a doubling of average yields?
(6) an increase in labour productivity by a factor of 
5.5 times, and of farm output by 8 times, the 
present level.7
Three measures were proposed by which these conditions
could be achieved: the reform of market-support procedure
by placing land in reserve, social grants and grants for
modernization.8 Obviously the recommendations of the Vedel
Report were closely aligned to those of the Mansholt Plan.
The Vedel Report differed only in that it favored price
reductions and a greater emphasis on the withdrawal of land
from the agricultural sector.
In response to the Vedel Report, French farmers 
staged nationwide protests from November 13th through the
7Marsh, pp. 154-155.
8Marsh, p. 155.
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2 8th in support of higher prices for their crops and to 
oppose government plans to reduce the number of small 
farms. In an attempt to appease these farmers, French 
Minister of Agriculture Duhamel publicly stressed that the 
fact that the government had published the report did not 
mean that it had accepted its conclusions and proposals.
By November 1969, in response to the ever-growing 
opposition by farmers, both the Mansholt Plan and the Vedel 
Report were revised. The eventual goals for each of these 
proposals were reduced in order to appease agricultural 
producers, yet the plans still attempted to make some 
structural changes. Though farmers were still not 
completely satisfied, they accepted these new proposals 
since their impact would not be as drastic as those of 
previous proposals.
In 1969, farmers once again proved that their 
consolidated voice and actions can influence the decision­
making process of Europe and their own governments. By 
demonstrating their discontentment, European agricultural 
workers succeeded in reducing the level of structural 
reform pursued by the EC. More important in regard to 
this thesis is the influence French farmers had upon their 
government. Had it not been for their opposition to the 
Vedel Report, French government officials may have 
implemented policies which today could have had an impact 
upon the numbers in agriculture and their income level.
Had French officials pursued the recommendations of the
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-Vedel Report, today's French agriculture population might 
have been even lower than 8% with an income level even 
lower than it is currently. In 1969, the French farmer's 
fight against the Vedel Proposal could also be regarded as 
a battle for self-preservation. Once again they proved 
they had the power to influence policy-making not only in 
France, but also within the European Community.
C. 1983 case study;
Another case, similar to the one of 1969, occurred in 
the Spring of 1983. In late April of 1983 the Mitterrand 
government came under severe attacks in a series of demon­
strations organized and led by several different groups for 
various reasons. Students, businessmen, and farmers all 
held separate protests, some of which ended in clashes with 
the police. In 1982, agricultural revenue increased by 
9.1%, but this increase was not equally distributed among 
farmers.9 Wine and oleaginous producers gained the most, 
while fruit and vegetable farmers received the least. In 
response to this, by April of 1983, French agricultural 
producers began protesting that the EC's CAP policies and 
France's importation of food were the causes for declines 
in their incomes. On April 25th, farmers in Normandy 
attacked governmental offices in Caen, and unsuccessfully 
attempted to burn down these buildings; similar attacks on 
that same day were also launched in Auxerre and Burgundy.
9,'Le revenu agricole moyen a progresse de 9,1% en 
1982," Le Monde (5 May 1983), p. 1.
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On April 26th fanners blockaded transit points on the 
French-Belgian border in order to prevent imported food 
products from entering the French market. Loads of 
imported pork were dumped unto the roads and a convoy of 
1,000 pig farmers, holding captive a West German meat 
truck, headed to Paris in order to protest EC policy.
French Minister of Agriculture, Michel Rocard, feared 
further protest and violence on the part of farmers, after 
EC officials failed to reach a resolution on European 
agricultural prices on April 28th. Indeed, after the 
28th, French farmers increased their pressure upon the 
government by carrying out further manifestations. The 
farmers1 push upon the government caused France1s Prime 
Minister, Pierre Mauroy, to side with agricultural 
producers and pursue policies which reflected their 
interests. On April 28, 1983 Prime Minister Mauroy, while 
addressing the French National Assembly, made the following 
statement:
Here, all of us must be keen to depend agriculture 
to obtain the dismantlement of these farming sub­
sidies. Unfortunately, today, it is not easy to undo 
what was once, not long ago, requested by France. 
However, all of us must fight to obtain satisfaction 
and we should be unanimous in defending the interests 
of France and its agriculture instead of creating 
problems as some are doing.10 (Translation by 
Josette L. Hawkes)
10,,Les agriculteurs francais veulent bloquer les 
frontieres," Le Monde (29 April 1983), p. 10.
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A partial reduction of the amount of French monetary 
compensations was officially confirmed by the government on 
May 3, 1983. This reduction would, in time, cause an 
increase in French agricultural prices, which definitely 
served the interests of France's farmers. Once again 
French agricultural workers were successful in influencing 
French officials into pursuing policies which were to their 
benefit. The events of 1983 caused the French government 
to choose the interests of its farmers over those of the 
European Community. The French government's commitment to 
its farmers continued throughout 1983, causing disagree­
ments and disunity within the European Common Market.
Members of the EC met June 17th through June 19th of 
1983 in Stuttgart, West Germany, in order to settle their 
budgetary disputes, which they had failed to resolve 
earlier that year. By 1983 the majority of the EC's budget 
was being used to provide compensation payments to European 
farmers. Disagreement among Community members occurred 
when Great Britain began arguing that it was pouring far 
more money into the EC budget than it was receiving.
British officials explained that only countries with large 
agricultural sectors, such as France, were benefiting from 
the CAP, since they were receiving a fair return and, 
sometimes even more, on their investment into the Common 
Market budget. As a result, Great Britain requested that 
the EC refund it $1.7 billion from its 1983 contributions
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to the Community. EC officials agreed to repay $670 
million to Great Britain, but no comprehensive agreement 
was reached covering the future of the CAP budget.
Officials did agree that Finance and Foreign Ministers of 
the member nations would meet in Athens, Greece, in 
December to resume negotiations.
By December, budgetary disputes also encompassed 
arguments between those who wanted to rectify EEC finances 
by cutting spending programs (this option being most 
favored by Great Britain;) and those who wished to continue 
these programs and raise more revenue, probably by increas­
ing VAT (value added tax) contributions made by member 
countries (a solution promoted by France). The Athens 
summit, held December 4th through the 6th failed to yield 
any accord on a plan for reforming the finances of the EC. 
The budgetary disputes also prevented Spain and Portugal's 
request for entry into the Community from reaching the 
floor for consideration.
In 1983, the French government's renewed commitment 
to its agricultural producers is a major factor explaining 
France's continued opposition to EC budget reform proposals 
which did not reflect the interests of French farmers. This 
1983 case demonstrates the ability of French agricultural 
producers to sway government opinion and policy in their 
favor. It also reinforces the concept that the pursuit of 
self-interest on the part of EC members undermines the goal 
of unifying Western Europe. Though in 1983 the French
government's policies favored its agricultural sector, it 
undermined the unity and further integration of Europe, 
since it caused a further delay of the EC's approval of 
Spain and Portugal's entry into the Common Market. There­
fore, often when French policy-makers choose to side with 
France's farmers, it is at the cost of the Community and 
European integration. It is quite possible that had the 
events of 1983 not occurred, Spain and Portugal might have 
entered the European Common Market at an earlier date than 
they did in 1986.
D. Conclusion
Unlike in Corporatist systems, the French government 
has shown an inability to consolidate and maintain control 
over its nation's interest groups. In the case studies 
presented, French agricultural producers have demonstrated 
that they can effectively use their power to influence 
policy decisions in France. Through the use of their 
voting power, as in 1965, and demonstrations, as in 1968 
and 1983, farmers have been able to persuade the decison- 
making process in their favor. Even state established and 
supported groups, such as the FNSEA, have demonstrated 
opposition to the government as seen in 1965. The 
activities of these farmers' groups represent the existence 
of pluralism in the French system. Corporatism does exist 
at times, for example government officials sometimes meet 
with leaders of these pressure groups in order to facili­
tate discussions and improve state/interest group
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relations. Therefore, since some forms of corporatism can 
be found along side pluralism, the French system can not be 
categorized into either model and should therefore be 
labeled a quasi-corporatist state.
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CONCLUSION
States are founded and operate under various types of 
governmental systems. Societies, made up of different 
people with diverse interests and ideas, often organize 
themselves into many groups, known as interest groups, in 
order to most effectively express their demands to their 
government. It is this relationship between governments 
and interest groups that the theories of corporatism and 
pluralism seek to explain. Pluralists believe that there 
is an unspecified number of interest groups within a 
political system. These pressure groups operate volun­
tarily, are self-determined, competitive and nonhierarchi- 
cally ordered. Groups are neither created nor controlled 
by the state. In a pluralist system there is no monopoly 
of representation within respective interest categories.
The best example of the pluralist model is the United 
States, where members of society are free to organize 
themselves and are self-guided and controlled.
Corporatism represents a completely different set of 
ideas. Corporatists believe that the interests of society 
are organized by the state into a limited number of groups, 
which are noncompetitive and hierarchically ordered. A 
monopoly of representation exists within respective cate­
gories. The government also controls the inner operations
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of these groups and the manner in which they choose to 
express their demands.
Many scholars have often categorized France as a 
corporatist nation. In some ways the French system is 
characterized by some traits of corporatism, for example in 
its agricultural sector, The Federation Nationale des 
Syndicats d'Exploitant Agricoles (FNSEA) was organized and 
developed by the state in 1946 in order to represent the 
interests of farmers. Though today it is no longer under 
government control it still operates under its favor. 
Another example of corporatism in France is the existence 
of open communication between government officials and 
leaders of pressure groups. However, the characteristics 
of corporatism are often outweighed by pluralistic ones.
For example, the interests of the agricultural sectors are 
not represented by just one group, various groups have been 
established sometimes working in conjunction, at other 
times opposing one another. Nor are these interest groups 
under government control, as seen in the three case studies 
presented in Chapter IV. They often use the power and 
effects of strikes, demonstrations, public propaganda, and 
personal contacts to influence the decision-making process 
in their favor. All of these traits of the French system 
represent characteristics of pluralism. Therefore, since 
corporatism in France co-exists with pluralism, it would be 
wrong for scholars to label this a corporatist system.
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Instead France should be labelled as a quasi-corporatist 
state.
Defining France as a quasi-corporatist nation raises 
some implications for Europe and possible explanations for 
the lack of unity within the EEC. After World War II 
France, along with other European nations founded the 
European Communities, in hopes of eventually integrating 
both their economic and political systems. The dream was 
to form a "United States of Europe" by 1992. So far 
however, their desire for unity has been undermined by the 
lack of cooperation and support within the organization. 
Quasi-corporatism offers a possible explanation for this 
lack of congruency. For example in the French agricultural 
sector, the state has often found itself having to choose 
between the interests and demands of its farmers and those 
of the EC. The case studies presented in Chapter IV 
demonstrate how influential French agricultural producers 
can be in the formulation of policies that concern them. 
With the Community at one end of the scale and domestic 
interest groups at the other end, the state has become the 
pivotal force that often determines which way the scale 
will lean. It is when interest groups succeed in persuad­
ing their government to tip the scale in their favor that 
the unity and integration of the European Community is 
undermined. If EEC members are truly committed to 
economically and politically integrating themselves by 
1992, they need to fully support the Community and possibly
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promote corporatism within their nations in order to better 
control the interests of their societies.
The French model suggests that the corporatist/ 
pluratist concept is incomplete. These two approaches 
stand at opposite ends of the spectrum. However, as seen 
in this study of France and its agricultural interest 
groups, there is a need for a theory which lies in between 
these two approaches...possibly quasi-corporatism.
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